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SURVEY - MASTERING STRATEGY Part 11:
Modular strategies in cars and computers By MARI SAKO & Fiona MURRAY
Summary
The focus of many European and American companies is currently on "modular"
strategies in product design and production. A modular product has individual
elements which are designed independently but function together as a seamless whole.
In this article Mari Sako and Fiona Murray compare the experiences of the
computer industry - where modularity was consumer led - with that of the automobile
industry where the impetus for adoption has come from cost and complexity
reduction. They discuss the strategic choice between integration and modularisation
for original equipment manufacturers, note the changing role of suppliers, and
conclude by describing recent research which highlights regional differences.
The automobile industry has been the source of major strategic thinking throughout
this century. Ford's moving assembly line, for example, first standardised work, while
Taiichi Ohno's Toyota Production System and, more recently, lean production
techniques were important managerial innovations. The design, manufacture and
distribution of the automobile capture the key strategic challenges associated with a
complex and technologically sophisticated product with the result that companies in
other sectors have sought inspiration and lessons. Now the focus of many European
and American manufacturers is on so-called modular strategies in product design and
production. This article assesses the success of this new development and its value as
a strategic weapon in the search for new sources of competitive advantage in
manufacturing industries.
What is a modular strategy?
A modular strategy is a strategy that leverages the advantages of modular product
architecture. A modular product is a complex product whose individual elements have
each been designed independently and yet function together as a seamless whole. This
kind of product has been rapidly adopted in the computer industry where the modules
might be thought of as including hard disk drives, operating systems, and
microprocessors. By adopting a modular strategy, International Business Machines
was able to achieve dramatic reductions in the lead times for designing and
manufacturing its System 360. However, the definition and subsequent
standardisation of the modules led to the success of Microsoft and Intel, as value was
captured not by the architects of a modular strategy but by the modular suppliers.
Nevertheless, the distribution of the profits resulting from the adoption of a modular
strategy is driven by different industry specific characteristics, as the following
contrast between computers and automobiles show (see Figure 1)
Figure 1
Drivers of modularity:
computers vs. autos
The main impetus towards modular computer products was modularity-in-use:
consumers were demanding compatibility, upgradability and retention of elements of
their existing computer systems. This starting point led to much investment of time
and effort in the creation of global design rules and standardised interfaces between
modules. Modular product architecture in turn led to a modular business organisation
with independent design teams. In the US at least, the eventual disintegration of the
industry into modular suppliers was facilitated by the availability of venture capital
for start-ups and the mobility of technical labour between firms.
By contrast in the car industry the impetus to adopt modules was production, rather
than demand led. The attraction of modular production systems is that they reduce the
complexity, capital assets and cost of assembly. In modular assembly, production
tasks are broken down into separable elements that can be carried out independently.
The final product is then assembled from these large sub-assemblies. While Italy's
Fiat adopted an in-house modular production system in the 1980s in order to increase
automation in the face of labour problems, it can also be used as a step towards the
outsourcing of production. Outsourcing shifts complexity, assets and cost to suppliers.
The next logical step after modularity in production is to design products with
modularity in mind. Modular design separates the design task into separable units,
which may or may not follow the same elements as the separable production units.
These clearly defined product boundaries also present the ultimate manufacturers with
considerable opportunities to outsource the design process and reduce the complexity
of the design activity (see Figure 2).
Figure 2
In response to this pressure from vehicle manufacturers, suppliers in the automotive
industry are consolidating to create a broader and deeper base of technical knowledge
and financial resources. Companies such as Delphi Automotive Systems (formerly
General Motors parts division) have expanded their technical capabilities to
incorporate fibre optics, multimedia, energy systems, and electronics. Some suppliers
are changing their business strategy in order to provide much greater levels of
technical expertise than they have done traditionally, so as to become involved in the
design of modules. These companies are also increasingly involved in the production
of modules and sub-assemblies. Rather than shipping components to the
Manufacturer's plant, they are setting up sub-assembly product lines which are off site
but typically only a few kilometres away from the final assembly site. In Alabama, for
example, Delphi assembles the cockpit for the new Mercedes M class car with a 120
minute window for assembly and delivery onto the final assembly line. Until it
reaches the line, the cockpit is still owned by Delphi and it is Delphi which remains
responsible for its quality.
In short, there are two quite distinct stages in the shift towards modular products. The
first is to separate the product into discrete modules either for design or for
production. The second is to consider whether to outsource these activities to
suppliers. The separation of the car into distinct production elements is relatively
straightforward. Indeed there has been an ongoing process of simplification and
separation since Henry Ford first adopted the principle of standardised work on his
moving assembly lines :
However, the design process is more difficult to separate because the car is at once a
group of physically contiguous sub-assemblies and a series of systems - climate
control, safety, electronics and so on. System integration is essential to performance
and yet systems may criss-cross physical sub-assemblies to a degree that renders their
separate design almost impossible without sacrificing performance.
The contrast with computers is instructive in comparing the strategic outcomes of
creating modular products. As noted earlier, the main catalyst for modular computer
products was modularity in use. Design work at IBM strove to meet this goal. IBM
found that the electro-mechanical system was susceptible to separation without
significant performance reduction (although it is interesting to note that the most high
performance computers are not designed with modular hard drives, operating systems,
etc.). Modularity in production was not a major driving force in the computer
industry, and IBM's conscious decision to outsource the development and the
production of the operating system to Microsoft and the chip to Intel for personal
computers came much later than its decision to adopt a modular product architecture.
Despite significant differences between the two industries, the IBM experience also
raises important lessons in the possible consequences for industry organisation,
industry power and profits that can come from the changing shape of product
architecture. The value added from computers shifted rapidly from the overall product
architect, namely IBM, to the designers and producers of modular system elements
such as Intel and Microsoft. Are the same trends likely in the auto industry and in
other industries? And what are the strategies that the auto manufacturers and suppliers
ought to follow?
Modular strategy and competitive advantage
The strategic choice facing original equipment manufacturers or OEMs is whether to
remain integrated or to become modular. Integrators will retain control of the entire
design and production processes. They will continue to make a wide range of
investments in both capabilities. Close control over the entire design process gives an
Integrator the advantage of retaining technological leadership. This will be hard to
manage if technologies become standardised and controlled by dominant module
suppliers. An Integrator will also control the entire production process and therefore
has control and oversight of quality and complexity.
The problems with this strategy are the problems that OEMs typically face as the
automobile comes to incorporate a wider range of technologies – overly stretched
R&D, problems associated with technical diversity, costly capital investment in new
plants and complex production. One step towards alleviating these problems is to
retain technical control of R&D and design but to shift to highly modular production
processes with a considerable reliance on suppliers. Mercedes seems to fit this model.
It conducts substantial R&D in-house while shifting production complexity to large
suppliers who produce modules and make investments close to final assembly plants.
Modularisers lie at the other end of the spectrum. They will shift the complexity of
production to suppliers and in so doing also follow a path towards modular design that
facilitates modular production. They will then increasingly rely on suppliers to
provide not only production expertise but also design and technical expertise.
Modularising OEMs will lose technical leadership and may risk undermining the
source of value added as technical control shifts to the suppliers. OEMs' retention of
"shadow engineering" in-house attests to this fear. However, Modularisers can retain
value through brand, customer service, product styling and innovative overall product
concepts (the Smart car, Mercedes' entry into the small car sector, is a good example
here). They can also retain value through global presence, facilitated by the reduced
investment that outsourcing enables them to bear. In fact, Modularisers might be
primarily interested in adopting modules as a cost cutting or asset minimising
strategy.
To summarise the OEM's strategic choice, sustainable profits come from the control
of assets and market position. Competitive advantage may derive from a number of
sources, including technological innovation, standard setting, and brand management.
But in the shift towards modularisation, the source of control is not yet clear in the
global auto industry. It is too early to say whether there has been a decisive shift in the
balance of power within the industry.
Where do these strategies leave the suppliers? We often think of company strategies
in isolation from the rest of the industry. But in fact, supplier and OEM decisions are
inextricably linked. Major European and US suppliers are making active decisions to
pursue a modular strategy. This means broadening the range of their technical skills,
and making investments in design and system capabilities and R&D, in order to be
able to bring a unique range of design concepts to the table well in advance of specific
design competitions. For these strategies to pay off, modular suppliers must first
target the modularising OEMs. They will be their early customers.
If modular suppliers start to own intellectual property that can shape the industry, they
will have greater leverage over the integrators. The reason that IBM was forced to
abandon the operating system market was because the supplier of the operating
system "module" - Microsoft - owned the industry standard. Only a few suppliers,
however, can earn their living by designing modules and setting standards. Whilst a
first-tier module supplier which trades directly with OEMs can earn higher profits
than lower-tier suppliers, the latter may be component suppliers which have a separate
competitive advantage in the shape of its focused R&D and specialist knowledge. Just
as an OEM Integrator requires the co-operation of specialist component suppliers to
realise its strategy, a modular supplier also relies on strategic alliances with other
suppliers that have complementary technical capabilities.
Implementing modular strategies
Modular production has been largely pioneered in greenfield site projects. In the
absence of existing constraints from plants, labour contracts, and local suppliers,
modular suppliers can be brought together around the production plant as seen in the
Smart plant and VW's Resende plant in Brazil. With brownfield sites, existing
physical and human assets inevitably limits the extent to which modularity can be
used in production. Union opposition to outsourcing is a typical constraint faced by
many OEMs.
Even in a greenfield site, however, modular design needs to be organised by engineers
and R&D managers from the core organisation. Modular design changes the roles of
these individuals, from one of part design and part specification to one of high-level
systems integration and module performance specification. Despite recent moves
towards integrated product development teams, functional specialisation ('chimneys')
still exists in some OEMs. For example the design of a cockpit requires at a minimum
technical capabilities in plastic moulding, electronics, audio, and electrical
engineering. In the same way that greenfield sites have provided an opportunity to
experiment with modular production, so modular design at companies such as BMW
(with the Z3), Mercedes (with its M class and Smart models) has tended to start life as
innovative non-core projects.
Organisational history necessarily influences how modular strategies are
implemented. These different paths ultimately lead OEMs to retain, develop and
discard different capabilities. Take a car manufacturer that has a non-modular product
design and whose production is highly vertically integrated. This car company has a
choice of three trajectories for moving from the current position to the ultimate
position of modular design and outsourced production. The paths are: (1) by
designing modules and producing them in-house first before outsourcing them; (2) by
outsourcing non-modular components before moving towards modular design; and (3)
by simultaneously implementing modular design and outsourcing. Each path leads to
a different set of capabilities and performance outcomes for the supply chain.
In the first path, modular design is likely to be adopted only if it brings about
significant performance improvements and solutions to problems arising from
ergonomics and complexity. By the time modules are outsourced, suppliers would
benefit from the solutions found by the car manufacturer. In the second path,
outsourcing rather than modularisation is the initial driver, and it is unclear whether
the car manufacturer or the suppliers will end up taking a lead in proposing modular
design and the integration of components. In the third case, a simultaneous
implementation of modular design and out-sourced production may not necessarily
lead to the reduction of complexity if the task of dealing with complexity is merely
passed on from the car manufacturer to the supplier.
Figure 3
Thus, is the overall level of complexity in the supply chain reduced as a result of
modularisation and outsourcing, or does it remain the same as the car firm
externalises complexity down the supply chain? The answer depends on the boundary
of the organisation for which the architect has optimised their objectives. A car
company that produces modules in-house or has solutions to be implemented by
suppliers is likely to benefit from an overall improvement as a result of
modularisation. By contrast, a car firm which outsources modules without an in-house
set of solutions may end up not reducing the amount of complexity in the total supply
chain and therefore pay more dearly for the modules than if they were produced in-
house.
In Japan, the production of components was outsourced a long time ago. But so far,
Japanese companies within Japan are generally very cautious about outsourcing
modules. While modular assembly is being considered by some OEMs, it is largely
kept in-house (i.e. Path (1) in Figure 3 is dominant). In Europe, by contrast, the
outsourcing of components is a relatively recent phenomenon, and there is sufficient
push by some car manufacturers to outsource modules to suppliers (Path (3) in Figure
3). Also, some existing component suppliers are asked to form a consortium to supply
a module (thus completing Path (2)).
The global forces that lead to modularisation - the need to make large global
investments without expanding fixed costs dramatically, and the problems of
managing complex global organisations - may well have different implications in
different regions. It need not automatically lead, as some commentators argue, to
homogeneous managerial styles and industry structures. For example, our research
sponsored by the International Motor Vehicle Programme (IMVP) shows that in
Europe and the United States suppliers are making significant investments in order to
compete as module suppliers. They are spurred on by the demanding requirements of
the financial markets and the need to raise their contribution to the value added in
automobile development and production.  This suggests a possible shift in these
regions from adversarial supplier relationships to ones of active contracting based not
solely on price-per-part but on innovation, speed, and access to intellectual property.
In contrast, our Japanese colleagues have found limited willingness on the part of
Japanese OEMs to embrace modularisation. They prefer instead to stay with the close
but hierarchical supplier relationships they have built up over a long period. However,
as they too expand globally and build greenfield sites overseas, Japanese OEMs are
also becoming Modularisers, or at least Production Modularisers.
We might therefore see strategies that vary by country of origin of the OEM, with
Japanese companies following a different path to US or European ones, predicated on
their history and embedded capabilities. However, the pattern is complicated by the
geography of operations. In other words, OEMs may follow one strategy in
established plants but use greenfield sites and new car models as opportunities to
experiment with modularity in production and/or modularity in design. This leaves a
complex tapestry of industrial organisation and company strategies. The strategy of
OEMs will be contingent on country of origin, country of operation, and country of
the suppliers. Profitable suppliers must be sufficiently flexible to offer a range of
modular options, from production only to a complete design and production package,
catering for multiple OEMs.
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